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Price-dependent or inverse demand systems, in which quantities are exogenous and prices are the dependent variables, have been studied extensively in consumption economics. 1 Most of the studies of these systems have made use of either the direct utility function or the distance function to generate inverse Marshallian or Hicksian demands by applying, respectively, the Hotelling-Wold identity or the ShephardHanoch lemma. Recently, additional attention has been given to the benefit function, which was first introduced and developed by Luenberger (1992) . This function is now recognized to be of particular value in welfare analysis because its aggregation property makes it attractive to analyze welfare changes for heterogeneous consumers. The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 2 meaningful aggregate benefit, which could be used to measure the welfare implications of changes in the economy.
Despite its obvious potential for policy applications, there are few theoretical and empirical applications beyond those considered originally by Luenberger (1992 Luenberger ( ) & (1995 , Chambers, Chung and Färe (1996) , and Baggio and Chavas (2006) . A possible reason for the scarcity of applications is that the benefit function is not a convenient vehicle for generating empirical demand models, as the dual relationships between inverse Marshallian (or Hicksian) demands and the adjusted price functions derived from a benefit function are not well established. We provide here an attempt to establish such relationships.
The first aim of this paper is to advocate a more practical use of benefit functions in representing preferences and specifying inverse demand models. In particular, it proposes the exploitation of additional duality relationships to generate systems of price-dependent demand functions alternative to the more typical approaches to deriving inverse Marshallian and Hicksian systems. As will be clear from the following discussion, the price-dependent demand systems derived from direct utility functions, distance functions and benefit functions are intimately related by a series of relationships, which allow simple transformations from any one to the others.
Combining one of these relationships with known results for expenditure-normalized inverse prices allows expenditure-normalized inverse prices to be derived directly from the benefit function (a result to be referred to as the Hotelling-Wold Analogue for the benefit function). In this way the theoretical and empirical analysis based on benefit functions is greatly facilitated, and it is such analysis that forms the main theme of this paper.
The second aim is to demonstrate the feasibility of using benefit functions to
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 3 specify estimable yet general and regular price-dependent demand systems.
Differentiation of a chosen benefit function with respect to quantities yields
Luenberger's adjusted price functions, according to the envelope theorem. Since these functions are explicit in the unobservable utility level, in most cases they do not have a closed-form representation as their Marshallian counterparts i.e. in terms of the observable variables such as quantities. This "operational complexity" however need not hamper the empirical exploitation of benefit functions. 4 A simple one-dimensional numerical inversion allows estimation of the parameters of a benefit function via the parameters of the implied inverse Marshallian demands. The formal theory for using a benefit function in this context will be developed and illustrated in the next section of this paper. Luenberger (1992 Luenberger ( ) & (1995 , the benefit function (B) for these preferences is defined as:
The Benefit Function and Its Additional Duality Properties
( 1) B(x, u; g) = Max b {b s.t. U(x -bg)  u, and x  bg}, which measures how many units of g an individual is willing to give up to move from a utility u to the point x.
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Provided that the direct utility function is continuous, increasing and quasi-concave in x, then the benefit function is continuous, increasing and concave in x, decreasing in u, and satisfies a translation property:
Luenberger has shown that u = U(x) implies that B(x, u) = 0 if g is a "good" (that is,
x for all x and 0  ) and that B(x, u) = 0 implies U(x) = u if 0  x .
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 4 Luenberger (1992) and (1995) proves a duality between the benefit and cost functions corresponding to the utility function, and hence there is a duality between the benefit function and the corresponding direct utility function. Applying the envelope theorem, Luenberger introduces what he refers to as the "adjusted price functions", which can be derived from a benefit function via simple differentiation; i.e.
where the superscript "L" is to remind us that (2) are the Luenberger functions derived from a benefit function. Since the translation property implies
it follows that these price functions satisfy the normalization:
Because of the dependence of the equation systems in (2) on quantities x and utility u, the functions Similarly, the Hicksian direct demands (5) are homogeneous of degree zero in p so that again some normalization of prices is required. However, even with the standard normalization of prices derivation of inverse demands is not straightforward. As is well known, the Slutsky and Antonelli matrices are singular of rank N-1, and thus there is an essential singularity in the relation between direct and inverse Hicksian demands.
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Analogously to the case of inverse Marshallian demands, the inverse Hicksian demands can also be defined as the solution to a dual optimization problem: D(x, u) = Min r {r'x s.t. C(r, u) = 1}, where D(x, u) is the distance function, and C(r, u) = Min x {r'x s.t. u ≥ U(x)} is the normalized cost function, which uses the same normalization of prices as above. In this case, the envelope theorem gives
a result often known as the Shephard-Hanoch lemma. Of course a further alternative approach to generating inverse Hicksian demands is to specify the constrained optimization: Min x {r'x : U(x)  u} and to manipulate the first order conditions to solve for the r as dependent variables, as functions of x and u as independent variables.
Another possible normalization of prices is to use the arbitrary reference vector g introduced in the definition of the benefit function, and apply the normalization p'g = 1.
This amounts to the introduction of the alternative set of normalized prices s i = p i / p'g and allows the Hicksian demands to be written as (10)
Inverse demands might be written in the notation
A similar singularity exists between the Hicksian demands and the Luenberger price functions as between the direct and inverse Hicksian demands, as shown by Luenberger (1996) , and again the use of an appropriate dual result is the most straightforward way
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 7 to define the "inverse" relationship. Luenberger (1992) shows that provided U(x) is quasi-concave and continuous, the following duality relationship holds: Luenberger (1996) then defines the "adjusted price function" as an envelope result:
With sufficient differentiability this envelope result is that (14)
where, for clarity, the notation P System (14) is an inverse in the sense that: 8
These results suggest a two-step procedure in which the benefit function can be used to construct "standard" (i.e. functions defining expenditure-normalized prices) inverse Hicksian demand functions:
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems
With this background, it is illustrative to see how (18) can be derived more directly.
Recall that the benefit function is an implicit representation of the direct utility function: Estimation of demand systems is usually carried out using budget shares. Thus we collect the foregoing results together in a form that is referred to as:
The Hotelling-Wold Analogue for the Benefit Function: Given a functional form for a benefit function satisfying the appropriate regularity conditions, the corresponding inverse Hicksian and Marshallian share equations can be derived as (14)).
Since utility is an unobservable variable, one may think that empirical work should be restricted to the first two of these. However, the imposition of regularity conditions is crucial, since the duality results only apply in regions of regularity.
Because the indirect utility function and direct utility function are required to be quasiconvex or quasi-concave respectively, it is quite difficult to construct reasonably general (2000)), a small cost to pay for the enhanced regularity properties of the resulting representation of preferences. The purpose of this paper is to extend this analysis to the use of benefit functions, thus further extending the capacity to represent preferences by regular functional forms.
Because of the translation property, regular benefit functions are not as easy to generalize as are regular cost and distance functions. However, the following result is straightforward to demonstrate. Given m regular benefit functions each with reference vector g, then a positive weighted average of these m functions is a regular benefit function with reference vector g.
Note that the use of "flexible" functional forms is not attractive. Flexible functional forms (such as Translog) have one attractive property: the ability to represent an arbitrary set of price and income elasticities at a point in price-income space. Usually they cannot be constrained to satisfy the required regularity properties (apart from homogeneity) even at this particular point, but far more damaging is that they cannot be
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 11 constrained to satisfy the regularity properties required by a dual specification even over the sample space, let alone over points outside the sample space where we may wish to carry out policy analysis. (As an illustration, CGE models typically do not use flexible functional forms.) Thus well-known "flexible" functional forms are not necessarily useful for empirical specification of dual representations of preferences.
The Numerical Inversion Estimation Method
As shown in (20) and (21), the benefit function, together with its derivative property, provides a convenient vehicle for generating inverse Hicksian share systems.
Specifically, for a chosen reference bundle g and a parametric specification of B satisfying certain conditions, one could obtain a share system by the above result. If we could invert the benefit function B explicitly to give the implied direct utility function U(x), then the inverse Hicksian shares could be "Marshallianized" by replacing the u by U(x) as shown in (21).
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In practice, however, it is only in simple cases that it is possible to obtain a closed-form solution for U(x) for an arbitrary specification of B; it depends heavily on the particular parametric form of B. This paper focuses on the class of benefit functions for which such explicit inversion is not available; that is, solving B(x, u) = 0 for U(x) may not be accomplished analytically, and thus the benefit function cannot be equivalently represented by a closed form direct utility function.
For a given parametric form for the benefit function with parameters , the inverse Marshallian share system could be expressed implicitly by the set of functions:
, and (23) B(x, u; ) = 0.
Provided that the benefit function is strictly decreasing in u, then it becomes feasible to numerically invert (23) to express u as a function of x and . Therefore, given a specific
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 12 functional form for B and , the corresponding inverse share system can be written as: 
Benefit Function Specification
In this section, we examine the two specifications on which our empirical analysis is based. 11 The first specification, the Simple Non-Additive Benefit (SNAB) function, serves to make the theoretical arguments developed in Section 2 less abstract and provide a bridge to our empirical analysis. The choice is motivated by a number of reasons, mainly the simplicity of the functional structure, the ease of imposing and maintaining regularity conditions, and the fact that the number of parameters will not increase rapidly with the number of inputs under consideration. More importantly, it is general enough to include "implicitly additive preference structure" as hypothesis to be tested rather than maintained. For purposes of comparison, we present and estimate the budget share equations corresponding to a second specification, the Baggio and Chavas 
We have seen from (3) As indicated by (22), differentiation of (25) after some manipulation gives the inverse Hicksian budget share system:
It is evident from (25) that it is impossible to solve explicitly for the value of u in terms of x and . In order to convert (27) to a Marshallian system, the unobservable u in (27) has to be replaced by the numerical inversion of (25) at B0  .
The B&C Model
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The B&C model is obtained from the following specification of the benefit function:
where Xk, k=1, 2 and 3, are three positive and continuous quantity functions. The B&C model results if Xk are specified as: 
Elimination of u from (31) by the analytical inversion of (28) at the optimum (setting (28) equal to zero) leads immediately to the inverse Marshallian demand system, given by:
It is also transparent that, given the values of parameters and quantities of goods, the numerical inversion of (28) at the optimum to give u in terms of x and  and its substitution in (31) would give the same results as analytical inversion.
Brief Remarks on the Database, Estimation and Stochastic Specification
Price-dependent or inverse demand systems have been used recently to characterize short-run demand behavior for food, agricultural and fishery products. These systems seem especially useful in markets for agricultural and natural resource commodities where in the short run it is reasonable to argue that supplies are close to being perfectly inelastic. To illustrate the modeling and estimation strategies outlined in the preceding sections, the general SNAB function, its nested case (setting  to zero) and the B&C model were estimated using quarterly Japanese data on six categories of fish products - The data were further aggregated to quarterly frequency resulting in 84 usable observations, and were deseasonalized and mean centered prior to estimation. i) the SNAB function:  6 = 1, and  6 =  6 =  6 = 0; and ii) the B&C model:  6 = 1, and  6 =  6 =  6j =  j6 = 0 (j = 1 to 6).
14 Since the GAUSS language is ideally suited for handling the implicit representation of functional relationships, the price-dependent demand systems may be estimated by using the GAUSS 3.6.27 computer package with the modules NLSYS and CML. The estimation method is non-linear Maximum Likelihood, and the inequality restrictions in (26) are imposed when estimating the systems.
To implement the empirical analysis, the model has to be imbedded within a stochastic framework. To do so, we assume that the budget share equations are stochastic due to errors of optimization. Let w it denote the ith budget share at time t, z t a vector of all exogenous variables, and w t n = (w 1t ,……, w (N-1)t ) ' an (N-1) x 1 vector of w it .
15
The budget share system to be estimated may then be expressed compactly as:
(33) w t n = W n (x t ; ) + e t n , t = 1,……, T, where W n (.) is the vector of deterministic components of the budget share equations, and e t n is a vector of the error terms e it . To allow for serially correlated error terms, the following fourth-order autoregressive scheme is specified:
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(34) e t n = R * n e n t-4 +  t n , t = 2,……, T, where R * n is an (N-1) x (N-1) autocorrelation matrix, and  t n is a vector of serially uncorrelated error terms characterized by a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and a constant contemporaneous covariance matrix . By using (34), (33) could (1994) procedure, the N x N counterpart to matrix R * n (matrix R * ) is specified by:
 is an N x 1 vector of ones, and  1 to  N are the autocorrelation coefficients. In estimation, the typical elements of R * n ( R *ij n ) are recovered by using the identity R *ij n = R *ij -R *iN where R *ij is the typical element of matrix R * . Accordingly, estimation of the equation systems with fourth order autoregressive error terms can be carried out based on the system (35), with N additional parameter ( 1 ,……,  N ) to estimate in addition to parameters .
Because of the adding-up restriction of the budget shares, contemporaneous errors  t are correlated with a singular variance covariance matrix . To cope with the singular error structure, the system (35) is estimated by deleting one of the budget share equations in the share systems (27) and (32). The coefficients of the deleted share equation can be recovered by using the theoretical restrictions in conjunction with the estimated coefficients of the other share equations. As usual, the estimation should be independent of which equation is excluded. 
Analysis of the Elasticity Estimates:
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The quantity and scale elasticity estimates for the general SNAB evaluated at the sample means of the exogenous variables are reported in Barten and Bettendorf (1989) , Holt and Bishop (2002) , and Wong and McLaren (2005) . Additionally, most of these elasticities are generally greater than minus one, suggesting that all types of fish (except lobster) are own quantity inelastic, whereas the corresponding direct demands for fish are price elastic.
With respect to the derived Hisksian cross quantity elasticities (h ij ), they are generally small in magnitude -the largest Hicksian cross-quantity elasticity is for shellfish with respect to high value fish, illustrating weak gross substitutability among all types of fish. These findings are fairly similar to those obtained in Belgium by Barten and Bettendorf (1989) , in U.S. by Holt and Bishop (2002) , and in Japan by Wong and McLaren (2005) . Regarding the Marshallian cross quantity elasticities, magnitudes for these estimates are smaller in absolute terms than their Hicksian counterparts; all cross quantity effects are, however, still very small. We also find that most fish pairs are gross q-substitutes as indicated by the negative signs.
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Turning to the scale elasticities (y i ), the estimates are consistently negative whilst low value fish has the largest scale effect.
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More importantly, the estimated y i are fairly different from minus one, suggesting that preferences are non-homothetic. Of interest is that earlier estimates of the scale elasticities of Japanese fish consumption by Eales, Durham and Wessells (1997) , and Wong and McLaren (2005) range from -0.16 to -1.95.
Prima facie, our estimates of scale elasticities are somewhat comparable to those in the early studies, although they adopted different functional forms.
Analysis of Estimated Welfare Change:
The main reason for imposing regularity restrictions such as (26) is to obtain consistent estimates for welfare losses caused by quantity restrictions. By applying the theory developed by Luenberger (1995) and (1996) , the estimated inverse share system may be used to examine welfare changes Note first that, as expected, CB and EB are negative in all instances, indicating that Japanese consumers are made worse off after the reduction in the harvest of an individual fish species. For example, the CB for a 10% reduction in the supply of high (or medium) value fish is -0.259 (or -0.511) unit of x 6 . Furthermore, the largest (smallest) welfare loss associated with the supply reduction is for medium (or low) value fish. Interestingly, the numerical differences between the CB and EB estimates are rather small, amounting to no more than 0.117 unit of x 6 in all instances. In general, discrepancies between CB and EB are relatively small for medium and low value fish, lobster and cuttlefish, and are the largest for high value fish.
Narrow fluctuations over time in CB and EB estimates are observed for medium and low value fish, lobster and cuttlefish. On the other hand, we find that there are considerable variations in the magnitude of EB for high value fish across years.
Particularly, in 1985 the EB estimate associated with a 10% reduction in high value fish catch was -0.371 unit of x 6 , whereas the comparable estimate for 1995 was -0.186 unit of x 6 , over a 50% decrease (in absolute value). Possibly, this result simply reflects the decreased value of high value fish in 1995 versus 1985.
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Conclusion
The application of duality theory in consumer demand studies has allowed specification of a wide range of functional forms, which has helped considerably in the generation of empirical price-dependent demand systems. For the most part, specification has concentrated upon either the direct utility function or the distance function. Recently, more attention has been paid to the benefit function, but this has been mainly in the context of study of welfare issues. In this paper, we advocate a more extensive use of benefit functions in specifying inverse demand models by exploring the inter- Note: M1 (or M2) is the model with fewer (or more) independent parameters in the model comparison.
In each cell, the first value is the lower bound of the LDC critical ranges, computed as: Note: The constraints 0   5 ,  6  1 and 0   5  1 were binding, and hence no t-values are reported. The estimated t-ratios must be interpreted with care since the standard asymptotic theory is unfortunately inapplicable when parameters are subject to inequality constraints. In Baggio and Chavas (2006) , since the specification of the benefit function can be analytically inverted to derive the implied direct utility function, the closed form inverse (2000), and Wong and McLaren (2005) .
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The definition of a benefit function is illustrated in Luenberger (1995), pp. 98-99. 6 See Deaton (1979) .
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See Luenberger (1996), p. 449. 8 Superscripts have been suppressed for simplicity. The mapping from R to S is in fact equation 2.12 in Chambers, Chung and Fare (1996) . provides further insight into the relation between these functions. See also Chambers, Chung and Fare (1996) . This relationship also says something about the way in which the reference vector g may enter into the functional specification of B, since the corresponding inverse Hicksian demands are independent of g.
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This is essentially the procedure employed in Baggio and Chavas (2006) .
11 See Luenberger (1992) , p. 469-472 for examples of using other functional forms to represent the benefit function.
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See Eales, Durham and Wessells (1997) , p. 1157 for a complete description of the data.
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The seasonal adjustment of the data set was done with the help of SAMA procedure in TSP version 4.5 package. An alternative approach to accounting for seasonality's effects is to specify each  i (or  i ) parameter in (27) (or (31)) to be a function of three quarterly dummy variables and a constant, as suggested by Eales and Unnevehr (1994) , and Holt and Bishop
The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 30 (2002) . Note however that this will significantly increase the number of parameters, which may create estimation convergence problems.
14 The i th adjusted price function is derived by applying the envelope theorem to (25) i) the SNAB function:  6 =  6 =  6 = 0; and ii) the B&C model:  6 = 1, and  6 =  6 =  6j = 0 (j = 1 to 6).
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The superscript "n" indicates the last row (row and column) of the respective vector (matrix) has been annihilated. 16 Preliminary analysis revealed significant autocorrelation in the residuals of (33) at lag four.
17
For reasons of brevity, the elasticity equations derived from the general SNAB are not presented below. The derivations of these equations are available separately.
18
Scale elasticities (y i ), reported in the third part of table 3, measure the potential response of commodity price to a proportionate increase in all commodities. For example, the scale elasticity for high value fish is -1.212, which indicates that a 1% proportionate increase in all commodities will reduce the price (or the marginal value) of this fish category by about 1.212%.
